Security Related Codes for TinyOS & Mote

Following are some security related codes for TinyOS:

TinyECC: Elliptic Curve Cryptography for Sensor Networks

TinyECC 1.0 is a software package providing ECC-based PKC operations that can be flexibly configured and integrated into sensor network applications. It provides a digital signature scheme (ECDSA), a key exchange protocol (ECDH), and a public key encryption scheme (ECIES). TinyECC uses a number of optimization switches, which can turn specific optimizations on or off based on developer’s needs.

TinyECC 1.0 is intended for sensor platforms running TinyOS. The current version is implemented in nesC, with additional platform-specific optimizations in inline assembly for popular sensor platforms. It has been tested on MICAz, TelosB, Tmote Sky, and Imote2. TinyECC 1.0 supports SECG recommended 128-bit, 160-bit and 192-bit elliptic curve domain parameters.

More info here.

TinyKeyMan: Key Management for Sensor Networks

This package provides an implementation on TinyOS for pairwise key establishment in wireless sensor networks using the polynomial pool-based key predistribution scheme. It includes the implementation of the random subset assignment scheme and the grid-based scheme. These two schemes have a number of nice properties, including high probability (or guarantee) to establish pairwise keys, tolerance of node captures, and low communication and computation overhead. For details see the related publications.

More info here.

TinySeRSync: Secure and Resilient Time Synchronization for Wireless Sensor Networks

TinySeRSync is a software package providing both secure single-hop pair-wise time synchronization and secure and resilient global timesynchronization on MICAz motes running TinyOS. The secure single-hop pair-wise time synchronization protocol uses hardware-assisted, authenticated medium access control (MAC) layer timestamping. Unlike the previous attempts, this technique can handle high data rate in MICAz motes (in contrast to the low data rate in MICA2 motes).

The secure and resilient global time synchronization technique is based on a novel use of the µTESLA broadcast authentication protocol for local authenticated broadcast. We solved the conflict between the goal of achieving time synchronization with µTESLA-based broadcast authentication and the fact that µTESLA requires loose time synchronization.The resulting protocol is secure against external attacks and resilient against compromised nodes.

More info here.

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